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Technical Barriers to Interstate Trade:
Noxious Weed Regulations
Munisamy Gopinath, He Min, and Steven Buccola
We focus on regulations controlling the spread of noxious weeds, especially the trade effects
of regulatory differences across U.S. states. We specify a gravity model for each state’s seed,
nursery product, and commodity trade with each other state. Within the gravity model, we
examine the role of cross-state regulatory congruence arising from ecological and agronomic
characteristics and interest-group lobbying. A spatial-autoregressive Tobit model is estimated
with a modified expectation-maximization algorithm. Results show that weed regulatory
congruence positively affects interstate trade. By fostering cross-state regulatory differences,
consumer and commodity-producer lobbying reduce the value of interstate trade by about
two percent per annum.
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Human activity, especially cheaper and expanded
transportation, in the United States has exacer-
bated invasive species (IS) problems (Burt et al.,
2007; Margolis, Shogren, and Fische, 2005).
Over the past few decades, invasive plants, in-
sects, and microbes have created up to $100
billion in ecological and economic damage
(Pimentel, Zuniga, and Morrison, 2004). To
prevent the introduction and spread of invasive
plants, especially weeds, the federal govern-
ment has established two major regulations.
The first is a noxious weed seed (NXWS) list
under the Federal Seed Act (FSA) of 1939 and
its amendments, which prohibits or restricts the
interstate and international trade of agricultural
products containing noxious weed seeds. The
second, arising from the Plant Protection Act
(PPA) of 2000, bars importation and interstate
movement of plants recorded in a noxious weed
(NXW) list. The latter requires, in effect, that
nursery and greenhouse shipments be free of
listed noxious weeds. Both federal lists establish
either a zero (prohibited) or a defined (restricted)
tolerance level for each weed species. In addi-
tion to the two federal lists, states are authorized
by the FSA and the PPA to establish their own
NXWS and NXW list, respectively, based on
local ecological and environmental conditions.
Substantial size and compositional differ-
ences in noxious weed regulations (NXW and
NXWS lists) are observable across states. For
example, California had 119 noxious weeds in
its 2002 NXW list, whereas many Eastern states
had no NXW list at all. Differences among state
noxious weed regulations likelyare motivated to
protect local ecosystems and reduce agricultural
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 2010 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationproduction costs, but can also create significant
barriers to interstate trade. That is, a NXWS list
is expected to respond to local climatic and
ecological conditions but may also be impacted
by interest groups’ rent-seeking activities. For
instance, seed producers may have an incentive
to lobby their legislature for an especially strin-
gent NXWS list to protect the local seed mar-
ket. From consumers’viewpoints, increasing IS
protection reduces agricultural product supply,
raising prices and impairing welfare; but to the
extent it also protects the ecosystem, welfare
may be enhanced. Like consumers, commodity
producers face a tradeoff between increased in-
put (e.g., seed) prices and reduced weed intru-
sions into their state. Questions about the sources
of interstate weed regulatory differences, and
whether such differences have affected inter-
state agricultural trade, remain unanswered.
The objective of this article is to estimate the
effects of weed regulations (NXW and NXWS
lists) on interstate agricultural trade while ac-
counting for regulatory endogeneity. A number of
analysts have investigated the link between trade
and environment (Copeland and Taylor, 2003).
Although trade’s influence on the environment
has been highlighted, environmental regulations’
impact on trade has received limited attention
(Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor, 2001; Costello
and McAusland, 2003). We address the latter
gap by investigating the trade effect of envi-
ronmental barriers implicit in weed regulations
of U.S. states, which otherwise freely exchange
goods.
For this purpose we have assembled, from
the 1997 and 2002 Commodity Flow Surveys
of the U.S. Department of Transportation, a
database on interstate trade of agricultural prod-
ucts. Our estimates show that trade among U.S.
states in seeds, nursery products, and selected
agricultural commodities are valued at approxi-
mately $5, $1, and $50 billion, respectively. We
also have compiled all 50 states’ NXWS and
NXW lists in 1997 and 2002 along with data on
respective ecological and environmental con-
ditions. Together with the data on state-level
demand characteristics, we specify an interstate
trade equation for three agricultural products:
seeds, nursery products, and agricultural com-
modities. A spatial autoregressive Tobit model
of interstate trade is estimated with a modified
expectation-maximization algorithm (Anselin,
Florax and Rey, 2004; LeSage, 1999; Maddala,
1983; LeSage and Pace, 2004).
To achieve our objective, we specify a gravity
model of interstate trade in seeds, nursery prod-
ucts, and commodities (Feenstra, 2004). The
gravity model relates trade between two coun-
tries to the size of the individual or combined
markets and the distance between them, in which
the latter proxies trade friction arising from ge-
ography and policies. Within the gravity model,
we examine the distinct role of cross-state weed
regulatory congruence arising from dissimi-
larities among states’ ecosystems, agronomic
conditions, and interest-group behaviors. Three
economic interest groups are considered in each
state: consumers, seed producers and nursery
growers, and commodity producers. Using the
fitted regulatory congruence values, we then
estimate the effects of noxious weed regulatory
similarities on interstate agricultural trade, pay-
ing attention to the lobbying effects of the three
interestgroups. The tradedistortionarisingfrom
lobbying has implications for resource reallo-
cation in seed, nursery, and commodity pro-
duction across U.S. states.
A Gravity Framework for Interstate Trade
Our focus is on distortions created by weed reg-
ulations in the interstate trade of seeds, nursery
products, and commodities. In the following,
we first use a standard gravity-type equation to
model interstate trade. Here, each (base) state’s
trade with another (comparator) state is specified
as a function of their weed-regulatory similari-
ties, controlling for market, endowment, agro-
nomic, and ecological characteristics. Within the
gravity framework, we then model the endoge-
noustrade frictionarisingfrom weedregulations,
which depend on states’ ecosystems, agronomic
conditions, and interest group behavior. Finally,
we use the gravity model to identify the inter-
state trade effects of weed regulatory differ-
ences arising from interest group activity.
The gravity model is highly popular in the
empirical modeling of trade flows because of
its strong explanatory power. Originally pro-
posed by Tinbergen (1962), the gravity model
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is directly and inversely proportional to the size
of and distance between the two markets, re-
spectively. Anderson (1979) is the earliest at-
tempt to model the theory underlying such
gravity models followed by Bergstrand (1985)
and Helpman and Krugman (1985). Feenstra
(2004) and Frankel (1997) provide a good
overview of the theoretical and empirical issues
related to gravity trade models. We adapt the
gravity models of international trade flows to
the case of U.S. interstate trade.
1
We begin with the specification of trade be-







ijðLij, Aij, Iij, T
g
ijÞ,
where g5s,n,m denotes seeds (s), nursery
products (n), and commodities (m); Lij is the
indicator of weed regulatory similarities or con-
gruence between i
th and j
th states; Iij and Aij is
a vector each representing ecosystem and agro-
nomic dissimilarities between the two states;
and T
g
ij is a vector representing gravity-type
variables: distance, common border, and relative
size (gross domestic product [GDP]) and en-
dowment. Our specification ofinterstate trade in
Equation (1) includes not only variables com-
monly found in gravity models (T
g
ij), but regu-
latory differences (inverses of Lij)a sw e l l .I n
the gravity specification, we also consider eco-
system and agronomic characteristics because,
together with endowments, they determine pro-
duction and trade patterns among states.
Although most variables on the right-hand
side of Equation (1) are likely predetermined
(e.g., distance, border, ecosystem characteris-
tics), regulatory congruence (Lij) is likely en-
dogenously determined (Copeland and Taylor,
2003; Goldberg and Maggi, 1999). Min et al.
(2008) present a simple political–economic
framework to derive weed regulatory congru-
ence as an interplay of the demand and supply
of such regulations. Demand arises from two
sources. First, scientifically based concerns
exist about the integrity of the local ecosystem
if foreign species are introduced. Second, eco-
nomic interest groups view weed regulations
as a way to increase private rents. The supply of
weed regulation is provided by policymakers
empowered to erect barriers against products
containing invasive species. Following Min
et al. (2008), we specify Lij as:




where k5c,s,m denotes consumers (c), seed and
nursery producers (n), and commodity producers
(m).
2 Equation (2) suggests that the similarity
between any two states’ weed regulations is a
function of dissimilarities between 1) their eco-
system and agricultural characteristics; and 2)
the relative lobbying, wk
ij, of interest groups who
seek changes in weed regulations to protect re-
spective interests. We consider the role of three
interest groups in shaping weed regulations.
First, consumers face a tradeoff from decreas-
ingregulatory congruence: reduced agricultural
product supplies along with raising prices vs.
welfare improvements by protecting the eco-
system. Second, seed producers and nursery
growers gain both from the higher product
prices and the agronomic protection embodied
in weed regulations. Finally, commodity pro-
ducers face a tradeoff, like consumers, between
increased seed (input) prices and reduced weed
intrusions into their state. Thus, the net effects
of lobbying on regulatory congruence, which in
turnaffects intestate trade,areanempiricalissue.
Substituting Equation (2) into Equation (1),













1Data from each of these industries, for example,
and the American Seed Trade Association and Amer-
ican Nursery and Landscape Association are sugges-
tive of market environment similar to monopolistic
competition underlying gravity models. Some pro-
ducers or groups may have market power, but that is
beyond the scope of the present study.
2We model interstate trade in three products
(seeds, nursery products, and commodities) but only
consider the combined lobbying of seed and nursery
producers in Equation (2). The reason is interstate
trade data are more detailed than the lobbying contri-
butions data available to us. See the data section for
details.






ij in Equation (3) allows us to identify the
extent of interstate trade distortion in each of
the three commodities when interest groups
engage in lobbying activity.
Data
The U.S Department of Transportation’s Com-
modity Flow Survey for 1997 and 2002 is the
source of our data on interstate trade flows.
3
These data include origin and destination states
and value and quantity of interstate trade in our
three categories of interest: agricultural seeds,
nursery plants, and agricultural commodities.
The seeds category contains cereal grain seeds,
leguminous vegetable seeds, and miscellaneous
seeds such as of grass, tobacco, trees, and or-
namental flowers, whereas nursery plants in-
clude live trees and plants, bulbs, roots, flowers,
and similar products. For agricultural commod-
ities, we have data on interstate flows of five
major field crops: corn, wheat, grain sorghum,
oats, and barley. Trade flows by origin and des-
tination can be represented by a 48   48 matrix
yielding 2304 state pairs. Unsurprisingly, we en-
countered a large proportion of zero (export) ob-
servations. Note that by setting Q
g
ij ðg5s,n,mÞ
equal to exports, we also capture the import
information. For example, the i
th state’s seed
import from the j
th state is exactly the same as
the latter’s seed exports to the former. In other
words, if state i imports seeds from state j,t h e n
Qs
ij 50, but Qs
ji equals the value of seeds
exported by the j
th state to the i
th state. We
therefore have a censored dependent variable
in which nonzeros ranged from 5% to 10%
depending on commodity and year (Table 1).
We draw on Min et al. (2008) to construct
a4 8  48 matrix of regulatory congruence (Lij)
based on state NXW and NXWS lists in 1997
and 2002. For instance, the NXWS list regu-
latory congruence is represented by a 48   48
of the overlap matrix











where AL, AR, and WY denote Alabama,
Arkansas, and Wyoming. Each row gives the
number of overlap occurrences of the given
state’s weed species with each of the 48 con-
tiguous states, including itself. For example,
the first row gives AL’s list overlaps first with
itself, then with each of the remaining 47 states.
The matrix is therefore symmetric with diagonal
elements consisting of the number of noxious
weeds listed in the respective state. Because
states differ in the number of weeds they list, we
created a corresponding percent-overlap matrix
by dividing the weed overlap numbers in each
row of the 48   48 matrix by the diagonal ele-
ment in that row. For instance, the first row of
Equation (1) is divided by the number of nox-
ious weeds in AL’s list. Resulting diagonal ele-
ments are unity; off-diagonal elements vary
between 0 and 1 depending on the percentage of
species overlap. We have every state’s noxious
weed seed lists and their sublists—prohibited
(NXWSP) and restricted (NXWSR)—in both
years. However, 26 states in 1997 and 14 states
in 2002 did not report a NXW list. Hence,
the 48   48 matrix of NXW overlap is con-
structed such that the rows and columns cor-
responding to states lacking a weed seed list are
set at zero.
We measure cross-state ecosystem differences
(Iij) using Bailey’s (1995) four-level hierarchical
classification of U.S. ecoregions: domains, di-
visions, provinces, and sections. Specifically,
we use the data underlying the classification
such as land surface form, climate (temperature
and precipitation), soil, and surface water charac-
teristics to measure ecosystem differences across
U.S. states (National Resources Inventory, 1998).
All county-level data are aggregated to state-
level indices using county shares of state land
as weights. Seven variables are used to repre-
sent a state’s ecosystem: average temperature
(mean January temperature); average precipi-
tation (days of measurable precipitation per
year); variance of temperature; variance of pre-
cipitation; a land index (computed with princi-
pal component analysis of the shares of cropland,
3Our choice on years coincides with availability of
interstate trade data from the Commodity Flow Survey
conducted once every 5 years by the U.S. Department
of Transportation. The choice also represents regula-
tions before and after PPA’s implementation in 2000.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Gopinath, Min, and Buccola: Noxious Weed Regulations 621pasture, rangeland, forest, small and large urban
area, and miscellaneous land in total land area);
soil index (from a principal component analysis
of such soil characteristics as sandy, silty, clay,
loamy, organic, and other); and water index
(from a principal component analysis of such
water body size classifications as less than 2,
2–40, and more than 40 acres). For each eco-
system variable, we construct a 48   48 dis-
similarity matrix as before (Min et al., 2008).
Each row provides the percentage differ-
ences in the given ecosystem variable between
theindicated state,itself,andthe other47states.
Diagonal elements of a dissimilarity matrix are
zero, whereas off-diagonal elements take values
between negative and positive infinity.
We use two measures of a state’s agronomic
characteristics (Aij): irrigated share of total
cropland and field-crop share of total cropland.
Field crops include corn, wheat, barley, soy-
beans, other grains, and cotton. These data are
obtained from the 2002 and 1997 Census of
Agriculture (U.S. Department of Agriculture).
A4 8  48 matrix of dissimilarity indices was
constructed for each of these two variables.
To represent stakeholders’ interests in weed




tained data on campaign contributions by in-
dustry groups in state politics (Institute on Money
in State Politics, www.followthemoney.org).
From these, we identified agricultural pro-
ducers’ political contributions, including, as a
subset, seed producers’. Because seed-producer
and nursery interests are similar to one another,
and because nursery industry contributions alone
were marked by several missing values, we
combined seed-producer and nursery contri-
butions together. A consumer-interest group
was constructed by pooling contributions from
a number of advocacy groups in the food-
product and environmental amenities arena.
Because welfare weights sum to one, we focus
on each group’s share in total dollar contribu-
tions. We then construct, for each of these in-
dustries, a 48   48 dissimilarity-index matrix
showing state-by-statepercentagedifferencesin
dollar-contribution shares. Note that a lobbying
dissimilarity index, wc
ij 5 wc









ij are per-capita personal
income, land-labor ratio, distance between two
states’ capital cities, and a dummy variable that
is unity if the two states share a common border,
zero otherwise. They all are commonly used in
gravity-type trade flow models in international
economics (Feenstra, 2004).
4 We use state-level
per-capita personal incomes and land-labor ra-
tios to, respectively, approximate income and
relative endowment differences. State-level
incomes are from the U.S. Department of
Commerce and land-labor ratios from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. Mileages between
states’ capital cities are drawn from a GIS map.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
Econometric Specification and Procedures
We face three econometric issues in estimating
Equation (3): endogeneity of L 
ij, censored de-
pendent variables Qij, and spatial dependency
of errors. We use a two-stage approach to
endogenize L 
ij, in the first stage estimating
Equation (2) and in the second stage using L 
ij’s
fitted values to estimate Equation (3). The
second two econometric issues require that we
simultaneously consider a limited-dependent
variable model with the possibility of a spa-
tially correlated error structure. Our interstate
trade data have a large proportion of zeros, i.e.,
censoring at zero, for which the appropriate
procedure is a Tobit model (Maddala, 1983).
Suppressing index g for notational conve-
nience, a linear specification of Equation (3) is
given by:












Qij 50 if Q 
ij £ 0,
Qij 5Q 
ij if Q 
ij >0 ,
where Q 
ij is the unobserved latent variable that
equals observed trade flow only when the latter
takes a positive value. Ordinary least squares
(OLS) will yield biased estimates because the
4GDP, population, and/or per-capita GDP can be
proxies for the sizes of two economies in a gravity
model (Feenstra, 2004; Porojan, 2001).
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, November 2010 622left tail of the distribution of Qij is censored
(Maddala, 1983).
5
Consider now the possibility of spatial de-
pendency in error term mij in Equation (4). Fol-
lowing the general approach of Anselin (1988),
a number of studies have used spatial econo-
metric methods to examine the adjacency effect
among counties, states or provinces, and re-
gions (Anselin, 1992; Case, 1992). The empiri-
cal, gravity-type trade literature has considered
spatial dependency as well (Blonigen et al., 2007;
Porojan, 2001; Weinhold, 2002). For instance,
Porojan’s (2001) comparison of standard and
spatial econometric approaches for estimating
gravity trade models shows the latter improves
not only the accuracy, but also the statistical sig-
nificance (efficiency) of estimated parameters.
In the present study, we specify a spatial error
model (SEM) in which tobit errors follow a first-
order spatial autoregressive process.
6 SEM is
motivated by the fact that excluded effects spill
across observation units and hence produce spa-
tially correlated errors (Anselin, 2006). Adjacent
states usually have similar ecological and envi-
ronmental conditions and therefore similar agri-
cultural commodities, seeds, and nursery plants.
These neighborhood effects are difficult to mea-
sure and often are excluded from or inaccurately
measured in Equation (4)’s independent vari-
ables. They then become a part of the error term,
which thus exhibits spatial correlation.
We employ the following error specification
for Equation (4)’s ith panel, that is the 48   1





where wij is the i-j
th element in the standardized
spatial weight matrix W, a 48 48 matrix of
known constants to capture cross-state spa-
tial correlation.
7 Parameter l is the spatial
autoregressive error coefficient, measuring
the strength of spatial error dependency. A
positive (negative) spatial correlation co-
efficient indicates similar (dissimilar) errors
in neighboring states. Specification (5) can
be extended to all 48 states.
Although tobit or spatial error models have
often been individually applied, their combi-
nation with a spatial autoregressive error model
is less common. This rarity derives partly from
the complexity of approximating multiple in-
tegrals, tedious even in small samples (Anselin,
Florax, and Rey, 2004; Kelejian and Prucha,
1999). We find three methods of addressing
spatial correlation in limited and discrete de-
pendent variable cases:LeSage’s (1999)Bayesian
approach or Markov Chain Monte Carlo sam-
pling; Marsh and Mittelhammer’s (2004) gen-
eralized maximum entropy estimator; and
the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm
(Case, 1992; McMillen, 1992; Pinkse and
Slade, 1998). All three have advantages but the
EM approach is straightforward, is least com-
putationally tedious, and has been applied to
spatial Tobit models (Anselin, Florax, and Rey,
2004; LeSage, 1999).
Expectation-Maximization Algorithm
Our chosen EM algorithm for estimating Equa-
tion (4), with error structure like in Equation (5),
entails two steps. The first is an E-step to cal-
culate the conditional expected value of the la-
tent variable given the observed variable. When
the conditional expected value substitutes for
the latent variable, the dependent variable is no
longer censored. The next or M-step thus in-
volves estimating a standard spatial error model
by maximum likelihood methods. Parameters
obtained from the M-step are then used in an-
other E-step and the process repeated until pa-
rameters converge to the maximum likelihood
estimates of the original multidimensional like-
lihood function. A drawback of the EM algo-
rithm in spatial autoregressive Tobit is that when
n is large, the spatial error model (M-step)
is computationally intensive (Fleming, 2004;
Kelejian and Prucha, 1999). To estimate Equa-
tion (4), we thus divide the M-step into two
stages as follows.
5We used OLS to estimate Equation (4) but the R
2
was under 1%. A fixed-effects model improved the fit,
but OLS estimators are biased when the dependent
variable is censored.
6This is the most commonly used form of spatial
error dependence (Anselin, 1988; LeSage, 1999).
7wij 5 1 if states i and j (i 6¼ j) are adjacent; wij 5 0
otherwise.
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ditional expected value of the dependent var-
iable (interstate trade flows) to replace the
unobserved latent variable. For this purpose,
Equation (4) is rewritten in matrix notation as:
(6) Q5Xb1m,
m5lWm1ee ;Nð0,s2Þ,
where Q is the (2304   1) vector of interstate
trade flows, whereas X is the (2304   k)m a t r i x
of independent variables and m the 2304   1v e c -
tor of error terms. Then, Equation (6) becomes:
(7) Q5Xb1ðI   lWÞ
 1e,
for which the error variance–covariance matrix
is given by:
V5s2½ðI   lWÞðI   lWÞ9 
 1.
Following Chib (1992) and McMillen (1992),
the expected value of the latent variable in
Equation (4) is:
(8) E½Q 
ij jQij 50 5X9
ijb   sii
fðX9
ijb=siiÞ





ij is the 1 k vector containing the i-j
th
observation on independent variables, and fð.Þ
and Fð.Þ are the density and distribution
functions, respectively, of a standard normal
variable. Parameter sii is the diagonal element
of the upper left 48   48 matrix of V. The zero
observation of the dependent variable in
Equation (6) is replaced by its expected value
from Equation (8).
M-step. Given the E-step computation, the
log likelihood function in the SEM model is:
(9)
LnðLÞ5  ðN=2Þðlns2 1 lnð2pÞÞ1 lnjI   lWj
 ð1=2ÞðQ   XbÞ9W 1ðQ   XbÞ.
As noted earlier, the primary problem in
obtaining the coefficients that maximize the log
likelihood function is the sample size (Anselin,
Florax, and Rey, 2004; Kelejian and Prucha,
1999). In our case, N and k equal 2304 and 10,
respectively. The additional concern in maxi-
mizing Equation (9) is that most software uses
the Newton-Raphson method, which some-
times finds only a local maximum. Therefore,
like in Kelejian and Prucha (1999) and LeSage
and Pace (2004), we implement the M-step
in two stages. The first is to estimate spatial
autoregressive parameter l by maximum like-
lihood; the second is to use l to transform the
data as in Equation (7) and estimate it with
OLS. These estimates are used, through Equa-
tion (8), to derive the latent variable’s new
conditional expected value, and the M-step is
repeated until estimates converge.
The added advantage of the EM approach is
that we can test the presence of error spatial
autocorrelation with Moron’s I test (Anselin,
1988, p. 102). Given the standardized spatial
weight matrix, Moron’s I statistic can be writ-
ten as I 5e9We=e9e, in which vector e repre-
sents tobit residuals and W is as defined below
Equation (5), i.e., a standardized spatial weight
matrix. Cliff and Ord (1981) define a standard
normal variable:
(10) ZðIÞ5½I   EðIÞ =VðIÞ
1=2,




ðN   kÞðN   k12Þ
are the mean and variance of the I-statistic, M
is the projection matrix (I   XðX9XÞ
 1X9), and
tr is the trace operator. The null hypothesis is
that spatial dependence does not exist in Tobit
residuals. Failure to reject the null hypothesis
would lead us back to the standard Tobit model
in Equation (4).
Results and Discussion
We first draw on estimates of the determinants
of interstate weed regulatory congruence, Equa-
tion (2), from Min et al.’s (2008, pp. 319–20;
Tables 2 and 3). They provide theresults offour
specifications of a weed-regulatory congruence
index: those based on NXWS, NXWSP, NXWSR,
and XW lists. The second and third of these are
sublists of NXWS regulation and refer re-
spectively to weed species with a ‘‘zero’’ and a
‘‘defined’’ tolerance level. In general, dissimi-
larities among state ecosystems, agronomic
conditions, and interest group activities have
statistically significant effects on cross-state
regulatory differences. Increasing seed producer
lobbying increases cross-state weed-regulatory
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, November 2010 624congruence. In other words, seed producers
treat noxious weed-seed lists as export barriers
so lobby for more cross-state regulatory uni-
formity. In contrast, consumers and commodity
producers appear to prefer weed regulations’
environmental and agronomic protection. That
is, both groups lobby for less cross-state regu-
latory congruence (Min et al., 2008).
Tables 2 and 3 report the SEM parameters of
interstate trade Equation (4) in 1997 and 2002.
Table 2. Estimates of Interstate Trade Equations, 1997
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Seed Trade Seed Trade Nursery Trade Nursery Trade Commodity Trade
Constant –20.077a –17.902a 7.980a –2.164a –379.876a
OL97NXWSP 65.792a 53.987a 16.195a 835.255a
OL97NXW 11.228a 3.137a 0.884a 91.618a
Border dummy –0.611 –1.678 6.420a 5.013a 43.85a







GDP97/Cap1 –13.553a –23.499a –14.002a –12.319a –44.559
LLR97– 0.022a 0.007 –0.003a 0.005a 0.244a
LLR971 1.620a 0.412 –2.913a –1.103a 43.141a
Spatial coefficient 0.775a 0.778a 0.703a –0.965a 0.829a
Moran’s I 0.245a 0.246a 0.843a 0.831a 0.240a
Beta coefficient
OL97NXWSP
0.665a 0.538a 0.411a 0.618a
Beta coefficient
OL97NXW
0.303a 0.202a 0.080a 0.184a
a Indicates statistical significance at least at the 5% level.
The 1 and – symbols next to a variable indicate the negative and positive scale of explanatory variables (dissimilarity indexes).
Model I includes NXWS list; Models II and IV include both NXWS and NXW lists.
Table 3. Estimates of Interstate Trade Equations, 2002
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Seed Trade Seed Trade Nursery Trade Nursery Trade Commodity Trade
Constant –9.859a –11.074a –5.714a –11.454a –378.727a
OL02NXWSP 47.516a 41.464a 6.859a 939.661a
OL02NXW 9.145a 12.147a 11.293a 78.266a
Border dummy 12.138a 11.084a 23.279a 22.695a 27.121a







GDP02/Cap1 –55.905a –47.468a –89.29a –88.283a –329.283a
LLR02– 0.005 0.002 –0.046a –0.045a 0.187a
LLR021 –0.573 –0.711 –25.739a –26.236a 2.792
Spatial coefficient 0.592a 0.671 –0.768a –0.779a 0.687a
Moran’s I 0.672a 0.679a 0.675a 0.674a 0.444a
Beta coefficient
OL02NXWSP
0.456a 0.394a 0.062a 0.573a
Beta coefficient
OL02NXW
0.253a 0.290a 0.268a 0.139a
a Indicates statistical significance at least at the 5% level.
The 1 and – symbols next to a variable indicate the negative and positive scale of explanatory variables (dissimilarity indexes).
Model I includes NXWS list; Models II and IV include both NXWS and NXW lists.
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are driven by the statistically significant lob-
bying effects identified in the Equation (2) es-
timates reported in Min et al. (2008). Model I
regresses interstate seed trade on NXWSP con-
gruence, whereas Model II considers the agro-
nomic protection provided by the NXW list to
seed producers even if nurseries are not used as
seed-production inputs. Similarly, Model III re-
gresses nursery exports on NXW congruence,
whereas Model IV examines the effects of
NXWSPandNXW congruence.Foragricultural
commodities, we report only one set of results
(Model V) in which, after a sequence of speci-
fication tests, we have included both weed lists.
These specifications are motivated by our
earlier theoretical hypotheses about how NXWS
and NXW lists both affect interstate trade.
Moreover, interstate trade specifications that
include both lists’ congruence variables were
statistically preferred tothose that excluded both
lists or included only one of them. Additional
specification tests failed to reject the hypothesis
that the direct coefficients of Iij and Aij in
Equation (1) are zero. That is, ecological and
agronomic variations affect interstate trade only
through weed regulations L 
ij. Over 90% of the
estimated SEM parameters are statistically sig-
nificant at least at the 5% level. Moran’s I sta-
tistics indicate spatial correlation is present in
all five Tobit models’ residuals in both 1997
and 2002. Estimated spatial autoregression co-
efficients l, measuring the level and direction
of spatial error correlation, are also shown in
Tables 2 and 3. Only one of 10 estimated autor-
egression coefficients is statistically insignificant.
Regulatory Congruence and Interstate Trade
In each of the Tables 2 and 3 models, we find
that fitted NXWSP and NXW regulatory con-
gruence (from Equation [2]) has a positive and
significant effect on interstate trade. The higher
the weed regulatory similarities between any
two states, the larger is their interstate agricul-
tural trade.
Our results on Equation (4) suggest that
weed-seed regulationis a barrier to seed exports.
Although the impact of weed-seed list overlap
(OL97NXWSP, read overlap of 1997 NXWSP
list) in Tables 2 and 3 (Model I) is slightly larger
in 1997 than in 2002 (OL02NXWSP), both
show that greater similarities in weed regulation
are associated with larger seed exports. This is
consistent with the finding of Min et al. (2008)
that seed producers lobby for greater regulatory
congruence. Our results indicate that NXWSP
likely protect biodiversity and environment but
also seem to distort interstate seed trade. Con-
gruence in noxious weed lists (OL97NXW or
OL02NXW) also has a positive and significant
effect on interstate seed trade, likely because of
the embodied agronomic protection (Model II,
Tables 2 and 3).
Models III and IVin Tables 2 and 3, relating
NXW and NXWSP regulations to interstate
nursery trade, show results similar to those in
the seed trade. The greater the cross-state sim-
ilarities in NXW and NXWSP lists, the larger
the interstate nursery trade. In 1997, the co-
efficient on NXWSP list overlap is greater than
on NXWoverlap; in 2002, the reverse is true. In
2000, moreover, the Federal Noxious Weed Act
was replaced by the PPA’s more stringent reg-
ulation of interstate movement in greenhouse
products(Tasker,2001).Before 2000,therefore,
NXWSP lists may have had a larger impact on
nursery trade than did NXW lists. However,
subsequent to the PPA, nursery trade likely has
been affected more by NXW than by NXWSP
lists.ModelVinTables2and3showsthatweed
and weed-seed regulations also affect interstate
commodity trade. The NXWSP list has a larger
impact than does the NXW list, and both effects
appear stronger in2002 thanin1997.In general,
we find that larger interstate trade in seeds,
nursery products, and commodities is associated
with greater similarities in weed regulations.
To further quantify the effects of NXW and
NXWSP lists on interstate trade, we show the
‘‘beta coefficients’’ in the last two rows of
Tables 2 and 3, representing the change in the
dependent variable resulting from a 1-standard
deviation change in an independent variable.
In general, and except in Model IVof Table 3,
the beta coefficients show that both NXWSP
and NXW regulatory congruence significantly
impacts interstate agricultural trade but that the
former can bring larger interstate trade flows
than do the latter.
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Differences on Interstate Trade
We also control for key factors common to
gravity-type models (Feenstra, 2004). Our pri-
mary control is the dummy variable capturing
common-border effects. In most models repor-
ted inTables 2 and3,the border effect ispositive
and statistically significant, consistent with
gravity-type trade studies (Feenstra, 2004). That
is, if two states share a common border, their
agricultural product trade is larger than other-
wise. Exceptions are Model I and Model II in
1997 in Table 2.
Anothervariable to capturegravity effects is
distance between capital cities. The distance
effect takes the expected negative sign in the
nursery trade but an unexpected positive sign
in the seed and commodity trade equations. We
think the unexpected sign of the distance co-
efficient is the result of the nature of the data
and type of econometric model used to estimate
the interstate trade equation. First, our censored
interstate trade data show a strong tendency for
goods to be exchanged between states that bor-
der one another. Because that effect is strongly
captured by our border dummy variable, we
have what, in more extreme situations, would
be called a ‘‘dominant variable’’ situation: the
distance variable accounts for a relatively small
share of the gravity effect. Second, regulatory
similarities decline as distance between states
rises (Min et al., 2008, Figure 1, p. 308). Reg-
ulations thus partly mimic the distance vari-
able. Moreover, our study is one of the first to
correct for spatial autocorrelation in a Tobit
model of intracountry trade. Several authors
have suggested that the spatial weighting matrix
(W in Equation [6]) likely captures some of the
distance effects (Anselin, Florax and Rey, 2004;
Porojan, 2001). For example, Porojan (2001)
reports a significant drop in distance’s impor-
tance as an international trade-flow barrier when
spatial econometric rather than OLS or fixed-
effects models are used. In short, these two
phenomena combine to produce a relatively
lower economic significance of the distance
variable in our interstate trade equation, and
a positive sign therefore can arise. For instance,
when regulations have accounted for friction,
distance may have a small positive trade ef-
fect because some consumers may regard ex-
changed products as exotic. In fact, we find the
economic significance of the distance variable,
i.e. the beta coefficient, to be relatively lower
among all explanatory variables in our spatial-
error model.
GDP or per-capita income is commonly used
as a demand indicator in gravity-type models.
We use income dissimilarity indices analogous
to those for the ecological characteristics de-
scribed in the data section. This index can take
a positive or negative value. A negative (posi-
tive) one indicates the base state’s income is
higher (lower) than the comparator state’s. The
expectation is that states with more similar in-
comes participate in more frequent agricultural
product trade. This is similar in the trade litera-
ture to a variety effect, that is intraindustry trade
motivated by a wish for the other state’s varieties
(Feenstra, 2004). We find that the greater—
in either direction—per-capita income dissim-
ilarity between two states, the lower the trade
between them: a variety effect.
Relative land-labor ratios are included in
Equation (4) to capture interstate trade’s endow-
ment motivations. We obtained mixed results
on the trade effects of endowment differences.
Seeds and agricultural commodities are land-
intensive goods, in which a higher relative land
endowment implies larger interstate trade. Nurs-
ery trade, however, shows a different pattern.
Most coefficients on nursery land-labor dissimi-
larities are negative, meaning a higher relative
land endowment implies smaller interstate trade.
In other words, greater relative labor endowment
implies greater interstate nursery trade. The
latter result may arise if nursery production is
more labor-intensive than is seed or commodity
production.
Interstate Trade Effects of Interest-Group
Lobbying
Differences in noxious weed regulations have
a scientific basis driven by ecological and cli-
matic variations. Yet some regulatory dissimi-
larity might be attributable to lobbying; if so,
trade distortions might be avoided, enhancing
trade flows and welfare. From the decomposition
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ij in Equation (2), we derive an interest
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Table 4 presents such lobbying contributions in
those cases in which lobbying effect L 
ij was
statistically significant. Statistically insignif-
icant contributions are reported as zeros. A
given contribution can be interpreted as the
interstate trade change induced by setting the
respective lobbying influence to zero. Con-
sistent with the Equation (2) estimates from
Min et al. (2008), the seed-industry lobby uses
support for greater congruence in NXWSP and
NXW lists as a way of promoting interstate
seed, nursery plant, and agricultural commod-
ity trade. Seed lobbies affect nursery trade
more than they do seed or commodity trade. In
particular, they enhance interstate nursery trade
by 0.038%, that is by approximately $2 million
in per-annum trade volume.
Recall that consumer lobbies reveal a pref-
erence for ecosystem preservation over food
price reductions. The consumer lobby un-
surprisingly has—by way of reducing NXWSP
congruence—a primarily a negative impact on
interstate seed, nursery, and commodity trade,
ranging from –0.315% to –2.302% (Table 4).
They also have small interstate trade effects
through the NXW lists. The effect through
NXWSP congruence reduction translates into
an annual decline of up to, respectively, $115
Table 4. Interest Groups’ Lobbying Effects on Interstate Trade









OL02NXWSP OL97NXWSP OL02NXW OL97NXW
Seed producer lobby 0 0 0.038% 0
Consumer lobby –1.084% –2.302% –1.320% 0.013%
Commodity producer lobby –0.870% 0 0.119% 0.096%
Model II
Seed Trade 2002 Seed Trade 1997
OL02NXWSP OL02NXW OL97NXWSP OL97NXW
Seed producer lobby 0 0.007% 0 0
Consumer lobby –0.946% –0.494% –1.889% 0.025%
Commodity producer lobby –0.759% 0.028% 0 0.179%
Model IV
Nursery Trade 2002 Nursery Trade 1997
OL02NXWSP OL02NXW OL97NXWSP OL97NXW
Seed producer lobby 0 0.036% 0 0
Consumer lobby –0.315% –1.227% –1.068% 0.004%
Commodity producer lobby –0.396% 0.111% 0 0.027%
Model V
Commodity Trade 2002 Commodity Trade 1997
OL02NXWSP OL02NXW OL97NXWSP OL97NXW
Seed producer lobby 0 0.005% 0 0
Consumer lobby –1.756% –0.346% –2.192% 0.015%
Commodity producer lobby –1.410% 0.020% 0 0.110%
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terstate seed, nursery, and commodity trade.
Commodity producer lobbying has con-
tributed, in a mixed way, to small increases in
seed and nursery trade by way of its impact on
NXW congruence. However, commodity lob-
bying reduces NXWSP congruence and, thus,
significantly reduces interstate seed, nursery,
and commodity trade. The commodity trade
effect, which is the most prominent, may arise
from commodity producer preference for ag-
ronomic protection, for example through the
use of locally grown seeds. Commodity pro-
ducer lobbying impaired interstate seed and
commodity trade by approximately $44 and
$705 million, respectively, in 2002.
Summary and Conclusions
We have investigated noxious weed regula-
tions’ impacts on interstate seed, nursery, and
agricultural commodity trade and explored
trade distortions arising from interest-group
lobbying. Estimable trade relationships, in the
form of a gravity model, are specified for each
state’s net trade with each other state in each
of the three goods categories.
Interstate trade data in 1997 and 2002 are
taken from the Commodity Flow Surveys of the
U.S. Department of Transportation organized
by origin and destination states. We compiled
all 48 contiguous states’ noxious weed seed and
noxious weed lists in each of those 2 years to-
gether with ecological, environmental, and de-
mand characteristics. We address three major
econometric issues in the estimation of the in-
terstate trade equation: endogeneity of regula-
tory congruence, dependent-variable censoring,
and spatial error dependency. An instrumental-
variable, spatial autoregressive Tobit model—
using a modified EM algorithm—is used to
obtain consistent parameter estimates. Fitted
regulatory congruences from the first stage en-
able second-stage estimation of each interest
group’s interstate trade contribution.
Results indicate that regulatory congruence
has a positive and significant effect on interstate
trade flow. The greater the regulatory similarity
between two states, the greater their interstate
trade in every product category. Interest-group
lobbying impairs interstate trade. Some of the
cross-state weed regulation differences respon-
sible for such impairment are legitimate conse-
quences of ecological differences and serve to
protect local environments. Other differences
appear to be consequences of interest-group lob-
bying. Although seed lobbies promote regulatory
similarity, commodity and consumer lobbies
promote dissimilarity, distorting trade.
Agronomic and ecosystem lobby interests
are generally legitimate. Price-enhancement
interests are, however, inconsistent with Sec-
tion 436 of the U.S. Plant Protection Act. More
seriously, they likely are inconsistent as well
with Article I, Sections 8 and 9, of the U.S.
Constitution prohibiting restraint of interstate
commerce. Eliminating trade-distorting lobby-
ing would enhance interstate trade by up to
$1.1 billion per year, a gain of nearly 2% over
present levels. Encouraging greater weed sci-
entist and biologist participation in county and
state noxious weed boards—empowered with
deciding which plant species are noxious weeds—
w o u l dg os o m ew a yt o w a r dr e d u c i n gt h e s e
distortions.
[Received March 2010; Accepted May 2010.]
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